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SERVING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE-A DILEMMA
PHILIP A. TRAUTMAN*

In an article written three years ago,1 this author introduced the
subject with the observation that, of the several grounds for a new trial
in Washington, one in particular had created considerable difficulty
for the supreme court, trial judges, and counsel. This was the rule
permitting a new trial when "substantial justice has not been done, '
and followed by the provision that, "In all cases wherein the trial court
grants a motion for a new trial, it shall, in the order granting the motion,
give definite reasons of law and facts for so doing." At that time I
stated:
The problem has been one of determining the degree of discretion resting with the superior courts under the above provisions, the scope of
review by the supreme court, and for counsel, the criteria for the drafting
of new trial orders to avoid reversal on appeal."

In the intervening period the Washington Supreme Court has had
several occasions to comment upon the question. It is the purpose of
this article to re-evaluate the problem in light of those decisions.
The Washington Supreme Court early recognized an inherent power
in the trial courts to grant new trials for failure of substantial justice.'
A difficulty arose, however, when the court concluded that a statement
by a trial court that substantial justice had not been done was sufficient
to preclude any review by the supreme court of an order granting a
new trial, except to determine if there was a case for the jury. Further
limiting the supreme court's power was a presumption that the reasons
for a new trial rested upon matters that could not be made part of the
record.
In 1950, in Coppo v. Van Wseringen,5 the court expressed concern
that "an iron curtain" had been created, "cutting off any adequate
review whether or not there was any reason for the trial judge to set
* Professor of Law, University of Washington
1 Trautman, New Trials for Failure of Substantial Justice, 37 WAsH. L. REV. 367

(1962).

R.PLEAD., Pn c. & Ploc. 5904W(9).
Trautman, supra note 1, at 367.
4 Brammer v. Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P2d 947 (1934) ; Clark v. Great No.
Ry., 37 Wash. 537, 79 Pac. 1108 (1905).
G36 Wn.2d 120, 217 P.2d 294 (1950).
2 WASH.
3
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aside the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial."8 The court did not
disapprove of granting new trials on the ground of failure of substantial
justice nor did it disapprove of the limitation on review when the basis
for the trial court's conclusion rested upon reasons outside the record,
which could not be made a part thereof.
The reason may be outside the record--'the lights and shadows' of the
trial, the very atmosphere of the courtroom, those things which are
manifest to the trial judge but which cannot be captured for the recordand in that event we agree that our review should be limited to the questions of whether there is a case for the jury and whether the verdict is
the only one possible as a matter of law.7
What the court did disapprove of was limitation upon its review when
the basis for the trial judge's action was entirely within the record or
could be made a part of the record.
There is no desire to interfere with the inherent right of a trial judge
to grant a new trial, subject only to the limited review now possible,
where the reasons for granting the new trial cannot be made a part of
the record. On the other hand, there should be some way of securing a
review of such an order when the trial judge's action is actually based
upon the record. Any rule adopted, to be effective, would require that
the trial judge state his reason or reasons for granting a new trial and,
also, whether the order is based upon the record or upon facts and
circumstances outside the record which could not be made a part thereof."
With this background, Rule of Pleading Practice & Procedure
59.04W was adopted in 1951 including as a ninth ground for a new
trial "That substantial justice has not been done." In addition, a
provision was adopted which now reads, "In all cases wherein the trial
court grants a motion for a new trial, it shall, in the order granting the
motion, give definite reasons of law and facts for so doing."
Prior to 1951 and the adoption of the rule, the supreme court seldom
reversed an order granting a new trial for failure of substantial justice.
In twenty-six cases decided between January 1951, and May 1962, in
which a new trial was granted in whole or in part for failure of substantial justice, nineteen were reversed and only seven affirmed.9 In
1950 the supreme court had indicated that by its anticipated new rule
requiring reasons it did not intend to interfere with a trial judge's
discretion in granting new trials for failure of substantial justice when
6 Id. at 123, 217 P.2d at 297. The court noted that a change might be implemented
in the new rules of court then under consideration.
7 Id. at 140, 217 P.2d at 305-06.
8
Id. at 142, 217 P.2d at 306.
9 These cases are reviewed in Trautman, supranote 1, at 375-95.
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based upon matters outside the record."0 The effect of the court's
decisions in the following ten years, however, was to considerably limit
the trial judge's powers by requiring him to state with particularity
what factors outside the record influenced his decision. The trial judge
was directed to describe in detail the atmosphere of the courtroom
which supported his conclusion.
In this author's earlier article, criticism was directed at the strict
construction of the rule in requiring statements of reasons by the trial
judge. It was stated that the court's interpretation was not in accord
with the original intent of the rule. Further, in balancing the powers,
merits, and defects of trial and appellate courts, their respective opportunities to judge the need for a new trial, and the practical ability of the
trial judge to adequately describe the atmosphere of the trial and other
extra-record factors, it was concluded that the supreme court was demanding too much in the way of detail.
It was noted, however, that in the then two most recent cases,"
decided in 1962, the court had given in dictum some indication of a
willingness to allow for greater discretion in the trial judge than had
been true in earlier post-rule decisions. The language of the court evidenced some willingness to allow for broader statements of reasons.
The hope was expressed that there would be greater liberality in future
decisions by construing the rule in favor of the trial court. There have
been additional cases and a reappraisal of the problems is appropriate.
In Sullivan v. Watson," the trial judge had denied a motion for new
trial and the supreme court affirmed. The appellants' brief quoted oral
statements by the trial judge suggesting that he would have granted the
motion on the ground of failure of substantial justice since the verdict
was overwhelmingly contrary to the weight of the evidence, but he
concluded that trial judges no longer had such power. Judge Hill stated
in an extended footnote that this was not the meaning of the supreme
court's decisions. To the contrary, a trial judge had a duty to grant a
new trial under such circumstances. What the decisions meant was that
the supreme court had been carefully reviewing the reasons for granting
new trials and that there had been a tendency to reverse. The hope was
expressed, however, that trial judges would continue to grant new trials
when they felt substantial justice was lacking, and if a reversal should
10 Coppo

v. Van Wieringen, 36 Wn.2d 120, 217 P.2d 294 (1950).
"-State v. Taylor, 60 Wn.2d 32, 371 P.2d 617 (1962) ; Martin v. Foss Launch &
Tug Co., 59 Wn.2d 302, 367 P.2d 981 (1962).
12 60 Wn.2d 759, 375 P.2d 501 (1962).
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then result, any error therein would rest with the supreme court rather
than the trial court.
The Sullivan case is of particular consequence not only for what was
said, but for the tenor of the opinion. At least some trial judges had
concluded that new trials should not be granted upon the ground of
lack of substantial justice. Sullivan was an attempt to dispel this belief
and to encourage trial judges to exercise their discretion, and to state

reasons in the best possible manner. The difficulty is that while trial
judges were encouraged to continue to grant new trials, it is doubtful
whether the superior courts will be receptive of the supreme court's encouragement if reversals of such rulings are to continue. While Sullivan
should have the effect of encouraging trial judges to grant new trials
where the reasons are based upon the record and can be readily de-

tailed, it is submitted that little change will occur in trial court rulings
in those cases where the prime factor is the non-record prevailing
atmosphere of the courtroom. The trial judge may have not only the

power but the duty to grant new trials even though he is unable to
detail his feelings and impressions, but the power is not likely to be
exercised nor the duty enforced, if a reversal appears probable.
In four cases decided in 1963 and 1964 the supreme court reversed

the grant of a new trial because the trial judge failed to state any reasons, or because the reasons stated did not support the conclusion. 13
Since there was either a complete failure to abide by the rule or a lack
of proper record factors to justify a new trial, with no indication that
23 Djrkan v. Leicester, 62 Wn.2d 77, 381 P.2d 127 (1963) ; Coleman v. George, 62
Wn2d 840, 384 P.2d 871 (1963) ; Nakanishi v. Foster, 64 Wn2d 647, 393 P.2d
635 (1964) ; Knecht v. Marzano, 65 Wash. Dec2d 272, 396 P.2d 782 (1964).
In Durkan the stated reason by the trial judge far granting a new trial was that the
verdict was inadequate. Judges Hill and Ott concurred in the reversal, but objected to
the reliance in the majority opinion upon Powell v. Continental Baking Co., 49 Wn.2d
753, 306 P2d 757 (1957) as the standard for reviewing the trial judge's reasons. Judge
Hill stated that, "If that case is to be the criterion by which we judge, we will affirm
very few cases in which a new trial has been granted on discretionary grounds." 62
Wn2d at 82, 381 P.2d at 130. The Powell case is commented upon in Trautman, supra
note 1, at 387-88.
In Coleman the trial judge granted a new trial on four grounds, one of which was
that substantial justice had not been done. The reasons given for the conclusion were
a summary of the other three grounds. The supreme court reviewed each of the other
three grounds independently and found that there was no error conuitted. Therefore,
"they do not constitute a sufficient reason for granting a new trial," on the ground of
failure of substantial justice. This was an instance in which the rule was complied with
insofar as a statement of reasons was concerned, but in which the reasons did not support the conclusion. It is to be noted that this was not a case in which there was an
accumulation of small errors, no one of which would justify a finding of failure of
substantial justice, but a combination of which might justify that result. See State v.
Boddo, 63 Wn2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963).
In Nakanishi,among other grounds, the trial judge stated that there were excessive
damages, resulting from passion and prejudice. Since no reference was made to circum-
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non-record considerations were controlling, these reversals were correct.
Four other cases granting a new trial, based in whole or in part on a
failure of substantial justice, were affirmed by the supreme court."
In each instance the new trial was based upon record considerations,
or if non-record factors were of consequence, they were of a nature
susceptible of rather exact description by the trial judge.
The last pertinent case, decided in 1964, was Baxter v. Greyhound,
Corporation.5 The trial court's grant of a new trial was based in part
upon the ground that substantial justice had not been done. The
supreme court modified this to provide for a new trial, unless the plaintiffs assented to a remittitur. In so doing, the supreme court recognized
the necessity of according considerable deference to the trial judge's
discretion, "particularly when it involves the assessment of occurrences
during the trial which cannot be made a part of the record, other than
stances which could not be made part of the record, the supreme court properly concluded that any justification for the order must be found in the record.
The trial judge in Knecht granted a new trial upon the ground "that substantial
justice was not done. The Court is unable to point to any precise or specific matter of
law or fact on which to base its ruling, but the Court has the strong feeling that substantial justice was not done based upon its whole impression of the trial." The written
order clearly did not comply with the requirement of a statement of reasons. In an
oral decision the trial judge assigned two reasons for his conclusion of a lack of substantial justice. One related to certain evidence favorable to the plaintiff which the
jury ignored and the other to a doubt respecting the reliability of the defendant's testimony. The supreme court considered the reasons, though they were not in the formal
order. As the evidentiary reason related solely to the record, the supreme court properly restricted its review thereto and simply concluded that there was evidence to support the jury's verdict. As to the second reason, the supreme court found the statement
of reason about credibility to be too indefinite. Had the trial judge attempted an
explanation of why he doubted the defendant's credibility, one wonders how strict the
supreme court would have been in construing that explanation.
Although the supreme court in the Knecht case reviewed the reasons stated by the
trial judge in his oral decision, the opinion suggests that this will not be done except
in rare instances. One may anticipate a justifiable hesitancy of the supreme court to
review other than written reasons. Counsel obtaining a new trial should therefore
make every effort to encourage the trial judge to put his reasons in writing. Although
the rule speaks in terms of the reasons being in the order itself, reference in the order
to a definite, filed, written opinion, which states the reasons, constitutes compliance with
the rule. See Bensen v. South Kitsap School Dist. No. 402, 63 Wn2d 192, 386 P.2d
137 (1963).
14 Rock v. Rock, 62 Wn.2d 706, 384 P.2d 347 (1963) ; Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen,
64 Wn.2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964); Cyrus v. Martin, 64 Wn.2d 810, 394 P.2d 369
(1964) ; Worthington v. Caldwell, 65 Wash.Dec.2d 251, 396 P2d 797 (1964).
In Rock, the trial judge set forth in much detail both record and non-record
considerations to support his order.
In Dipangrazio, the trial judge gave detailed reasons relating to the exclusion of
certain evidence and the admission of other evidence of an experiment.
The trial judge in Cyrus granted a new trial limited to damages upon the basis that
the jury had ignored certain evidence concerning the plaintiff's loss of earnings, with
the result that the verdict was inadequate and substantial justice was not done. The
supreme court affirmed, though ordering a new trial on all issues including liability.
In Worthington, the supreme court concluded that the record justified a new trial.
Substantial justice was found to be lacking because of an accumulation of errors at
the trial.
15 65 Wash.Dec.2d 405, 397 P.2d 857 (1964).
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through the voice of the trial judge in stating reasons for the action
16
taken
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the trial judges
and the supreme court have endeavored to reach a middle ground in
contrast to the extremes of no review, as was the situation before 1951,
or an overly strict requirement of reasons, as was the case in the decade
following 1951. Within more recent years, there is an indication that
at least some trial judges are attempting to do more in the way of
clarifying their reasons, while at the same time at least some members
of the supreme court are more aware of the problem confronting the
trial judges and consequently more willing to accept a good faith
attempt at compliance with the rule.
The most difficult situation is presented when the trial judge is
convinced that the general atmosphere of a trial is such that substantial
justice has not been done and yet he is unable to describe with particularity the basis for his conviction, other than to indicate that non-record
considerations are controlling. If a trial judge so states, is the balancing
to be in favor of his opportunity to determine the effect of the trial's
atmosphere upon the jury, or the supreme court's need for reasons for
review purposes? In my judgment, when there is doubt on the point,
the scales tip in favor of the trial judge for reasons discussed in my
earlier article."' On the basis of Knecht v. Marzano, 8 it appears that
the supreme court views the problem differently.
In the Knecht case, the supreme court properly reversed the grant
of a new trial because the record did not support the trial judge's
conclusion of a failure of substantial justice and no extra-record considerations were asserted to explain the new trial order1 9 However,
the court indicated in dictum that doubtful cases will continue to be
resolved against the trial court.
We can foresee and understand occasions when a trial judge may say,
"The jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, but X and Y extra1e Id., at 424, 397 P.2d at 869. The court also stated, "We are not satisfied, however,
that our evaluation of the factors alluded to by the trial court, for the purpose of

determining whether passion and prejudice were present, fully answers the question of

whether substantial justice has been accorded to defendants upon the issue of damages.

In this area it is impossible for us to gauge the impact of the appearance and attitude of
the witnesses, the atmosphere prevailing in the court room, the conduct or statements of
counsel, and the responsiveness of the jurors. We must, to a great extent, be guided

by the evidence, the reactions of the trial judge, as recorded in his oral decision and
order, and a tipping of the balance between the factor of the latitude offered the jury
and1 7the factor of our conscience."
Trautman, supra note 1, at 397-403.

1s 65 Wash.Dec.2d 272,
19 See note 13 supra.

396 P.2d 782 (1964).
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record factors, singly or in combination, caused the jury to give far too
much consideration to that evidence, which resulted in an unfair trial,
and consequently a new trial must be granted because substantial justice
had not been done." In other words, on rare occasions, it might be possible for a trial to be derailed,resulting in the failure of substantialjustice,
when, on appellate review and under the present application of the rule,
we would affirm the jury verdict. In any event, what we must insist on,
and what Rule 59.04W requires, is an adequate explanation of the
various extra-record factors which caused the jury to make a gross error.
If these reasons are present in the order granting a new trial, then this
court will undertake its duty to accord a fair review to the determination

of the trial judge who witnessed the derailing of the normally adequate
trial system. 20 (Emphasis added.)

While this language is perhaps suggestive of some greater deference to
the trial judge than was true in the decade beginning with 1951, it also
suggests that a rather strict construction of Rule 59.04W will continue.
This construction is clearly more stringent than that stated by the
court in 1950 in Coppo v. Van Wieringen, which provided the setting
for the rule.
There is no desire to interfere with the inherent right of a trial judge

to grant a new trial, subject only to the limited review now possible
[whether there is a case for the jury and whether the verdict is the only
one possible as a matter of law], where 2the
reasons for granting the new
1
trial cannot be made a part of the record.

The court supports its strict construction, in part, upon the fact that
without detailed reasons, appellate review is not possible. This is
certainly true. But there is also the fact that occasions may arise when
the trial judge is unable to be specific in his reasons, and if the supreme
court ignores this, simply reversing or reviewing only the record, then
the court is not fulfilling its function of reviewing the trial as it actually
occurred. The nature of the problem is such that neither alternative is
completely satisfactory. On balance, it seems to this author that it is
better to err on the side of no review and allow a new trial than it is to
err on the side of an inadequate review and deny a new trial.
However, Judge Finley, speaking for the court in Knecht, introduces
another consideration. The problem is not just to be one of balancing
trial and appellate court relationships, but it also involves the place of
the jury in our judicial system.
On occasion, we have had the conviction that a trial judge was dis-

guising a personal disagreement (possibly subconscious) with a jury
20

21

65 Wash.Dec.2d at 277, 396 P2d at 785.
36 Wn.2d 120, 142, 217 P.2d 294, 306 (1950).

SERVING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

1965]

result in his conclusion that substantial justice was not done. We have
thought that this was a clear invasion of the province of the jury, and we
have not hesitated to guard and to attempt to delineate clearly the boundary beween the factual decision-making functions of the jury and the
22
distinguishable functions of both the trial judge and the appellate court.
And again, in explaining the need for a continued strict construction
of the rule:
In this way we will recognize and give proper effect to the functions of
the trial and appellate courts and the jury. Most importantly... our fears
that trial courts could attenuate or water down the jury function will be
reasonably obviated by reasonably operable appellate review, and the
trial court and this court will not be parties to "jury shopping"; rather we
will be giving the parties litigant their just due-a fair trial. Since a jury
must still make the ultimate determination, the judge will not be invading
the jury box in granting a new trial for failure of substantial justice upon
proper and stated reasons.23 (Emphasis that of the court).
Insofar as the opinion is critical of my earlier observations because
they did not specifically treat jury consideration, the opinion is clearly
correct. However, care must be taken in evaluating the weight to be
given to the jury's determination when reviewing the exercise of a trial
judge's discretion in ordering a new trial.
A trial by jury at common law had reference not just to twelve men
deciding facts, but also encompassed, as an essential ingredient, a
judicial officer to supervise the laymen. The presence of a trial judge
with power to set aside a verdict was an essential part of the jury system. The United States Supreme Court has stated the concept as
follows:
"Trial by jury," in the primary and usual sense of the term at the
common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial by a
jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority to cause them
to be summoned and empanelled, to administer oaths to them and to the
constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution on their
verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and
under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the
law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal
charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or
the evidence. This proposition has been so generally admitted, and so
seldom contested,
that there has been little occasion for its distinct
2
assertion.

Wash.Dec2d at 277, 396 P2d at 785.
Wash.Dec.2d at 278, 396 P2d at 785.
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).

2265
2365

24
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Although the United States Supreme Court made the above statement in a case involving the meaning and application of the seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution, which does not apply to
the states, and the Washington position relating to commenting upon
the evidence is much more restrictive of the trial judge than is true in
the federal courts or at common law, the point to note is that the
position of the jury in our judicial system historically encompassed a
trial judge with much power in relation to the jury. Allowance of considerable discretion to a trial judge in determining the necessity for a
new trial is not inconsistent with the doctrine of trial by jury. On the
contrary, the trial judge's power to grant new trials has been declared
to be inherent by the Washington court as well as others, and its exercise recognized as not being in derogation of the right of trial by jury,
but as one of the historic safeguards of that right.25
In resolving the new trial problem, the court in the Kneckt case
placed considerable importance upon the jury's function because of the
constitutional provision26 and the decisional law" in this state which
prohibit the trial judge from commenting upon the evidence. The
constitutional provision is not directly in point, however. This provision
means that a judge is forbidden to convey or indicate to a jury, by word
or act, his personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of any evidence
introduced at the trial.2" The fear is that the judge's opinion will have
great influence upon the jurors' decision. A grant of a new trial by a
trial judge in no way conveys to a jury the judge's opinion. Such action
by the judge does not directly impinge upon the constitutional provision.
The court's reference in the Knecht case to the constitutional provision probably did not have in mind the thought that there was a direct
conflict, but rather that the provision was illustrative of the philosophy
of both the constitution and the decisional law in Washington in protecting the jury's function. It is important to note, however, that in
speaking of the right to trial by jury, the reference is to the jury as an
institution and not to any particular jury composed of any particular
twelve persons. Thus, it has been held that if one party is allowed more
than the maximum number of peremptory challenges provided for by
25 See Trautman, supra note 1, at 367-71.
28 WAsH. CoNsT. art IV, § 16. "Judges

shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law."
27 State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 251, 60 Pac. 403, 405 (1900). "There is no other
constitution that we have been able to find that is as prohibitive of the action of the
court in this respect as ours."
28 State v. Clayton, 32 Wn2d 571, 202 P2d 922 (1949).
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statute, the other party is not deprived of his right to a jury trial so
long as the final jury is impartial.2 9 No one has a right to have any
particular jurors decide his case. Likewise, in granting a new trial, the
judge is not taking away the right to a jury trial, so long as an impartial
jury eventually decides the matter.
One might raise the question of whether this means that the trial
judge should be allowed to grant multiple new trials for failure of substantial justice until he gets a verdict that satisfies him. Quite dearly,
if errors of law occur, i.e., incorrect instructions, multiple trials are a
possibility. The Washington court has also sustained the grant of multiple new trials to a party based on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the verdict." Likewise, it is possible that the trial
judge might properly conclude that more than one new trial is required
on substantial justice grounds. Of course, the fact that one new trial
had already been granted might be considered by the supreme court in
reviewing a second new trial order to determine whether there had
been an abuse of discretion. The point is that the mere possibility of
multiple new trials should not in itself preclude the granting of new
trials on substantial justice grounds.
As Judge Finley states in the Knecht case, the jury's function must
be considered along with the proper distribution of powers between the
trial judge and the supreme court in resolving the new trial problem. On
balance, it still seems to the author that in the event of doubt it is better
to decide in favor of a trial judge's conclusion that there was a failure
of substantial justice. It may very well be that the trial judge has
committed error or has abused his discretion, but there will be a new
trial with another opportunity for a jury to decide the matter and with
the possibility of appellate review again if it is necessary. On the other
hand, it may be that the trial judge has not abused his discretion and
that one party has not had a fair trial. To deny a new trial perpetuates
that error. In short, there is greater harm in erring on the side of denying a new trial than in granting a new trial. The following statement of
81 merits repeating:
the court in Baxter v. Greyhound Corporation
In approaching the issues thus raised, we start with the principle that,
except where the order is predicated upon a ruling as to the law, an
order granting or denying a new trial is not to be reversed unless it be
29
Creech
30

v. City of Aberdeen, 44 Wash. 72, 87 Pac. 44 (1906).
McCobe v. Lindberg, 99 Wash. 430, 169 Pac. 841 (1918). Cf. Thomas & Co. v.
Hillis, 70 Wash. 53, 126 Pac. 62 (1912).
31397 P2d 857, 867 (1964).
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for an abuse of discretion, and that a much stronger showing of an abuse
of discretion will be required to set aside an order granting a new trial
than one denying it....
The reason for the foregoing principle is quite patent. The granting
of a new trial places the parties where they were before, while a denial
of a new trial concludes their rights. The trial judge, by virtue of his
favored position, should be accorded room for the exercise of sound
discretion. He sees and hears the witnesses, the jurors, the parties,
counsel, and any bystanders. He can evaluate first hand candor, sincerity,
demeanor, intelligence, and any surrounding incidents; whereas, the
reviewing court is tied to the written record.

Prior to 1951 too great a deference was paid to the trial judge. In the
decade following 1951, the supreme court in several instances was too
strict. Within the past two or three years, there is an indication of an
attempt to reach a middle ground, with the trial judges stating their
reasons in more detail and the supreme court showing a greater awareness of the difficulties confronting the trial judges in specifying their
reasons.

There is still evidence of hesitancy by the supreme court to resolve
doubts in favor of the trial judge, however. Thus, the final observation
in the Knecht case must be particularly noted, namely, that the granting
of new trials for lack of substantial justice should be relatively rare. It
is said that this is especially true since Rule 59.04W gives eight other
grounds for granting new trials, the implication being that such other
grounds should usually suffice. The court did not mention that the
ninth ground is intended to serve as a catch-all provision and that by
its very nature it is often more difficult for the trial judge to assign
specific reasons. Though the necessity for the use of Rule 59.04W(9)
may be relatively rare, when the trial judge concludes that such an
occasion is present, his judgment should be accorded considerable
deference.
Perhaps a better conclusion is that the grant of new trials for lack
of substantial justice without detailed reasons should be rare, if not
completely absent. Seldom will non-record factors which cannot be
articulated be controlling. If they are, counsel and the trial judges had
best forget them and attempt to fit within one of the other eight
grounds. Unless and until a new rule is adopted or a less strict construction of the present rule prevails, a reversal of the new trial order may
be expected.

